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Abstract
The study is an explication of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human
Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), the first of the four-item
substantive agenda in the peace negotiations between the Philippine Government
(GRP) and the Marxist armed movement represented by the National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (NDFP). Signed in 1998, the CARHRIHL was a product of the
peace process that aims to end the decades-long armed conflict via negotiated political
settlement.
The research objective is to provide an evaluation of the importance of the CARHRIHL in
the entire peace process, and in the protection of the human rights of civilians amidst
the armed conflict, while providing recommendations to strengthen the CARHRIHL’s
implementing mechanism.
The study identified the three main factors causing the violations in the CARHRIHL –
(1) the Parties’ differences in the framework and operationalization of the CARHRIHL;
(2) the not fully functioning Joint Monitoring Committee ( JMC); and (3) the militarist
counter-insurgency campaigns by the GRP security forces. These have undermined the
peace initiatives of various stakeholders and the future of the peace process.
Among the research work’s recommendations were the following:
1. Effect procedures that protect human rights and repeal those that violate it and
rehabilitate the victims.
2. The GRP and the NDFP should honor the previously signed agreements that laid
down the objectives and guiding principles for the conduct of the peace talks.
3. The GRP and the NDFP must implement mechanisms of public consultations with
human rights organizations concerning human rights and the peace talks.
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Contemporary Philippine society is fragmented by and mired in various armed con-
flicts which for several decades now had claimed the lives of thousands of Filipinos
and impinged on the country’s economic prosperity, socio-cultural development and
overall progress.
The armed dissidence waged by the Marxist Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People’s Army-National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP-NPA-NDFP) is
considered by Philippine government security and defense agencies to be the most
serious threat to the country’s internal security and stability as the group operates
in and influences various localities in majority of the provinces of Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. The armed struggle being waged by this group for over four decades now is
considered as the longest-running armed rebellion in Asia. Since 1969 up to now, this
had already resulted in more than 30,000 lives lost as a result of armed confrontations
between the armed forces of the two parties.
In 1986, the popular government of President Corazon C. Aquino had stepped up
peace efforts by initiating the process of peace negotiations with the NDFP, the
umbrella organization of various groups belonging to the underground Left including
the CPP and the NPA. Peace talks between the GRP and the armed revolutionary
movement represented in the negotiating table by the NDFP were first conducted
from August to December 1986, but collapsed shortly after the massacre of landless
peasants rallying in front of the Presidential Palace in Manila in January 1987.
In 1992 President Fidel V. Ramos called for the resumption of the peace negotia-
tions with the CPP/NPA/NDFP. This effort gave birth to both parties’ adoption of The
Hague Joint Declaration which stipulates the substantive agenda of human rights and
international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional
reforms and end of hostilities and disposition of forces. It is the framework agreement,
declaring that principles of national sovereignty, democracy and social justice shall
guide the two Parties. Subsequently, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees ( JASIG) was signed in 1995. This is vitally important because it guarantees
safety and immunity to all participants in the peace process from both parties. The
guarantees include safe and unhindered passage of peace talks participants in all areas
in the Philippines and immunity from surveillance, arrest, detention and other punitive
actions (Casambre, 2006).
As a result of the vigorous effort by both parties to pursue peace and because of the
strongmomentum gained by the peace negotiations at the time, an historic agreement
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called the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was completed and signed in March 16, 1998 by the
GRP and the NDFP Peace Panels in the Hague, the Netherlands. The CARHRIHL was the
first of the four substantive agenda in the peace negotiations. It requires both Parties
to observe the highest standards of human rights and International Humanitarian Law,
such as those contained in the Geneva Conventions.
The signing of the CARHRIHL is meant to meet the needs arising from the concrete
conditions of the Filipino people concerning violations of human rights and principles
of International Humanitarian Law, and to find principled ways and means of rendering
justice to all the victims of such violations. It represents as the bilateral binding agree-
ment embodying the human rights instruments plus the four Geneva Conventions and
their Protocols translated into the current Philippine setup, the first of its kind in the
world.
Moreover, the CARHRIHL obligates the GRP to work for the immediate repeal of
any subsisting repressive laws, decrees, or other executive issuances. Under the
Agreement, the GRP is obliged to conduct a review of its jurisprudence on warrantless
arrests, checkpoints, saturation drives, warrantless searches, criminalization of political
offenses, and other similar cases.
But while the protagonists from the opposite side of the negotiating table consider
the CARHRIHL as a breakthrough, they view it from different perspectives.
For the GRP, signing the CARHRIHL serves the purpose of confidence-building with
regard to its sincerity and commitment to the expeditious resolution of the protracted
peace negotiations, while at the same time remaining steadfast in its claim of con-
tinued possession of the Filipino people’s sovereign mandate. Thus, when President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada signed the CARHRIHL, its implementation should be “in accor-
dance with the Constitution and legal processes of the Republic of the Philippines”
(Chronology of the GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations: 1988-2006, Philippine Peace Center,
2006).
For the NDFP, forging the CARHRIHL with the GRP is a clear evidence of parity
between them. The NDFP regards the signing of the agreement as a result of GRP’s
tacit recognition of the status of belligerency of the revolutionary forces. Although the
NDFP welcomed Estrada’s approval, it “directed all the NPA forces to implement the
Agreement in accordance with the constitutional framework and judicial processes of
the revolutionary forces and the NDFP in their respective areas of political authority”
(Casambre, 2003).
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While the GRP asserted its sole authority to arrest, prosecute and punish human
rights violators in the implementation of the Agreement, the NDFP, on the other hand,
demanded that its judicial and legal processes be allowed to co-exist with that of the
GRP.
Thus, not long after the signing of the CARHRIHL, serious obstacles once again threa-
thened the continuation of the peace process as both parties failed to agree on and
approve of the modality for the joint implementation of the CARHRIHL.
Nevertheless, after more than two decades of on-and-off peace talks between the
GRP and the NDFP, the signing of the CARHRIHL can already be considered as a great
stride towards the pursuit of peace. As the first of the four major substantive agenda
in the peace negotiations, the CARHRIHL plays a key role in the continuance of the
entire peace process as its sincere implementation not only builds trust and confidence
among the warring parties involved. It likewise provides legal and moral protection for
the people as well, in so far as upholding and promoting their basic rights is concerned,
amidst the raging armed conflict.
But for what purpose does the CARHRIHL serve if the people’s basic rights continue
to be trampled upon? What is the sense of continuing the volatile peace talks and the
tedious work of forging subsequent agreements if the first agreement continue to be
violated and unenforced?
It is in this context that this study is undertaken to provide a thorough and deep-
going understanding of the importance of continuing on the initial albeit substantive
gains the peace talks had achieved in the signing of the CARHRIHL. The study’s rel-
evance hinges on its evaluation of the hindrances and difficulties encountered in the
course of effecting the CARHRIHL and on its recommendations toward strengthening
the agreement’s implementing mechanisms.
The critical review and evaluation of the implementation of the CARHRIHL will gen-
erate an objective understanding of the substantive achievement made so far in the
peace negotiations which shall be presented from three different perspectives coming
from the GRP, the NDFP and human rights organizations.
It would be relevant to analyze this undertaking and the value of the CARHRIHL in
the peace talks in light of the concrete current realities obtaining in the Philippines,
i.e., the continuing prevalence of violations of human rights and the protracted armed
conflict. In the short run, this study should help both parties in strictly and consistently
effecting the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law in their
conduct of war, while in the long run, strengthening the CARHRIHL to help realize its
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objectives and role in the Filipino people’s pursuit of a just and lasting peace in the
Philippines.
While it is undeniably true that up to now the roadmap to peace is still being forged
by the GRP and the NDFP in the negotiating table, the Filipino people remains optimistic
that despite enormous obstacles, just and lasting peace shall someday see the light of
day. Among the majority of the Filipino people, there still is an undying hope to bring
into full fruition the strategic goal of the peace process – to bring about lasting peace
and national unity by rooting out the social and systemic causes of the armed conflict.
2. Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study is to provide an objective evaluation of the impor-
tance of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in the continuance of the peace negotiations between
the Philippine Government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, and
in the protection of the human rights of civilians or non-combatants amidst the ongo-
ing armed conflict. Likewise, this research work has endeavored to provide concrete
recommendations to strengthen the CARHRIHL’s implementing mechanism.
Specifically, this study answered the following questions:
1. What is the importance of the signing of the CARHRIHL in the peace negotiations
between the GRP and the NDFP, and in the protection of the human rights of civil-
ians or non-combatants amidst the ongoing armed conflict between the armed
forces of the two Parties?
2. What are the specific problems encountered in the implementation of the
CARHRIHL?
3. What are the concrete measures undertaken by the GRP and the NDFP to address
the violations in the CARHRIHL?
4. What can be done to strengthen the mechanism for the implementation of the
CARHRIHL?
3. Methodology
The researcher embarked on a qualitative approach to this study. As such, the writer
created this work primarily from analyzing the main texts of the CARHRIHL and other
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substantial agreements forged by the Philippine Government and the National Demo-
cratic Front of the Philippines during the entire course of the peace negotiations from
1986 up to the present.
The data and information on the CARHRIHL and the peace negotiationswere sourced
from published (books, official documents, media releases) and on-line materials
issued by the GRP and NDFP peace panels and their consultants, and human rights
organizations.
As supplemental source of information and for data verification, questionnaires for
interviews were distributed to selected informants who were selected based on their
direct participation in the peace negotiations and expertise and long experience as
field workers in human rights movement.
Key informants selected to answer the questionnaire distributed by the researcher
were composed of the following:
1. Member of the GRP Negotiating Panel who is a lawyer by profession and has long
served in the local government unit in Davao City;
2. Member of the NDFP Negotiating Panel who has served the NDFP side since 1991;
3. Leader of an alliance of human rights organizations in the Philippines who serves
as an independent observer to the peace talks and as the resource person on
human rights; a political prisoner and victim of human rights violations during the
Martial Law era;
4. Political prisoner and representative of a national peasant organization in the
peace process; former journalist and member of the academe;
5. Parish priest who works for the Campaign for Human Rights in the Philippines;
and
6. Organizer of the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines that
acted as one of the host organizations of the Third Round of Peace Talks held
in Rome, Italy in January 2017; her organization, the Italy-Philippines Friendship
Association collaborated with the Royal Norwegian Government as the Third
Party Facilitator in the GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations.
Additional information, such as testimonies of former political prisoners and other
victims of human rights violations, were gathered from peace fora, seminars and other
discussions held or sponsored jointly or separately by the GRP, the NDFP and human
rights organizations.
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Moreover, the video coverage and live streaming on the internet of the proceedings
of the Third Round of the Formal Negotiations held in Rome, Italy in January 2017
provided updated information on the peace negotiations.
Data and information obtained from the volumes of books, statements and other
literature issued by the GRP, the NDFP and human rights organizations were collected,
processed and analyzed towards the determination of the answers to questions raised
in the statement of the problem. Processed data and information were validated via
correnpondences with selected participants in the peace negotiations.
Documented cases involving violations of the CARHRIHL were also gathered for
analysis. To arrive at a factual data analysis, the researcher examined the actual con-
tents of selected complaint forms filed against the armed forces of the GRP and the
NDFP for alleged violations of human rights. These complaint forms were filed with
the Joint Monitoring Committee ( JMC) of the CARHRIHL.
The researcher juxtaposed the selected GRP and NDFP complaint forms against each
other comparing their respective data with respect to the following:
(a) personal circumstances of the victims;
(b) description of the incidents, if any; and
(c) allegations, evidence, supporting documents, possible motives, if any.
In this manner, the researcher distinguished the differences between the two com-
plaint forms.
Likewise, the researcher tabulated the incidents of violations recorded by the JMC
and categorized them according to year, region, and alleged perpetrator. In so doing,
the researcher was able to make a comparative study of the complaint submissions
coming from the GRP and the NDF and draw the study’s findings and conclusions
as to the causes of violations to the CARHRIHL. To validate these, the findings and
conclusions culled from the comparative study of the complaint submissionswere then
compared with the responses to the interview questions by the key informants.
4. Results and Discussion
The study, through the perspectives of the Philippine Government, the National Demo-
cratic Front of the Philippines and selected human rights organizations, revealed and
identified the following:
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1. The importance of the CARHRIHL in the peace negotiations and in the protec-
tion of human rights of civilians or non-combatants amidst the on-going armed
conflict between the armed forces of the GRP and the NDFP;
2. The problems encountered in the implementation of the CARHRIHL, the causes
of violations, the measures undertaken by the GRP and the NDFP to address the
violations; and
3. The steps that can be done to improve the mechanism for the implementation of
the CARHRIHL.
1. The study revealed that the implementation of the CARHRIHL, it being the first of
the four substantive agenda in the peace talks, is of crucial importance to the forging
of the succeeding agreements on socio-economic reforms (second agenda), political
and constitutional reforms (third agenda), and end of hostilities and disposition of
forces (fourth and final agenda). The study likewise identified the importance of the
CARHRIHL in protecting the rights not only of those directly involved in the armed
conflict but moreso of the rights of the civilians or non-combatants while the armed
conflict is still on-going.
For the GRP, signing the CARHRIHL serves the purpose of confidence-building
with regard to its sincerity and commitment to the expeditious resolution of the
protracted peace negotiations, while at the same time remaining steadfast in its
claim of continued possession of the Filipino people’s sovereign mandate. Thus,
when President Joseph Ejercito Estrada signed the CARHRIHL, he ordered that its
implementation should be “in accordance with the Constitution and legal processes
of the Republic of the Philippines” (Chronology of the GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations:
1988-2006, Philippine Peace Center, 2006). Moreover, signing the CARHRIHL’s Joint
Monitoring Committee Supplemental Guidelines during the latest round of the peace
talks in January 2017 was an indication of the GRP’s commitment to human rights.
According to the head of the GRP peace panel Secretary Silvestre Bello III, “the full
operation of the JMC with its Supplemental Guidelines in place should not be difficult
under our legal regime, that includes new and bold laws and statutes upholding human
rights and international humanitarian law such as the law against enforced disappear-
ances, Anti-Torture Act, International Humanitarian Law Act, Human Security Act, the
Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Kalikasan among others” (Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process, 2017).
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i6.2439 Page 1097
IRCHE 2017
Bello said that the signing of the Supplemental Guidelines does not only affirm the
Duterte administration’s commitment to human rights protection and adherence to
international humanitarian law, but likewise provides for a complete dividend of the
latest round of talks.
For the NDFP, forging the CARHRIHL with the GRP is a clear evidence of parity
between them. The NDFP regards the signing of the agreement as a result of GRP’s
tacit recognition of the status of belligerency of the revolutionary forces. Although the
NDFP welcomed the GRP’s approval, it “directed all the NPA forces to implement the
Agreement in accordance with the constitutional framework and judicial processes of
the revolutionary forces and the NDFP in their respective areas of political authority”
(Casambre, 2003).
According to one of the NDFP Peace Panel members who was interviewed by the
researcher, the strict implementation of the CARHRIHL is of prime importance for the
peace process to move forward especially because it is the first major item in the
substantive agenda in the peace negotiations. The CARHRIHL is deemed to serve as
preparation for the final truce at the end of the peace process, or as the rules of war
and protection of human rights for as long as the war has not yet ended.
The NDFP representative in the peace negotiations averred that “mutual trust and
confidence are essential if the peace negotiations are to succeed. He added, “non-
compliance is bound to erode mutual trust and confidence.”
“The first big test of the seriousness of the GRP in these negotiations is compliance
with the CARHRIHL. For if the GRP cannot fulfill its obligations in an agreement already
signed, what is our guarantee with regard to future agreements?” (Agcaoili, 2017).
As a matter of fact, the first major item of the agenda taken up by the GRP and
NDFP panels in the Third Round of formal talks held in Rome, Italy in January 2017
was the review of the implementation of the CARHRIHL as the NDFP had registered its
disappointment over the failure of the GRP to fulfill many of its obligations stipulated
under the said agreement.
From the perspective of the human rights sector, the key informant interviewed
by the researcher agreed that CARHRIHL protects and guarantees the basic rights
of the civilian population or non-combatants in the internecine strife between the
armed forces of the GRP and the NDFP. It created the mechanisms for promoting and
protecting human rights, trying and investigating human rights violations of both sides
and indemnifying the victims and their families.
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The human rights sector believed that amidst the armed conflict raging for almost 50
years now, the CARHRIHL is beneficial to the Filipino people, particularly for the non-
combatants or non-armed civilians who are not party to the attritive engagements
between the armed forces of the GRP and the NDFP.
The researcher found out that all the key informants’ views on the important role
the CARHRIHL plays in the peace process and in the protection of the rights of civilians
amidst the armed conflict, were almost identical by saying that “even if the two parties
are still at war, the people’s basic rights remain inviolable and should be protected.
Their basic human rights, safety and security of their homes and livelihood, and mobil-
ity should be guaranteed.” These human rights included civil and political rights that
protect a person’s liberty, safety, privacy, and freedoms of thought, speech, religion,
press, assembly and movement.
Both warring parties’ commitment to these is manifested by the signing of the
CARHRIHL which is applicable not only to persons, families and groups affiliated with
either party but also to all civilians and persons not directly taking part in the hos-
tilities, including persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed
conflict (CARHRIHL Preamble; Part I: Declaration of Principles; Part II: Bases, Scope and
Applicability, 1998).
Equally important, the researcher analyzed that the Agreement has set forth the
rules of war and the parties’ compliance to international humanitarian law. This means
that both parties are compelled to abide by and comply with international instruments
and conventions such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Geneva
Conventions and its Protocols.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as “rules of war” or “laws gov-
erning armed conflict”, embodies the universal principles and standards contained in
international treaties or conventions signed by states of the world and upheld by
some parties and organizations involved in armed conflict. Among these treaties or
conventions are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977.
The researcher has analyzed that the CARHRIHL serves the need to apply interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) to the specific conditions of the Philippines especially
because there are particular situations which may not be directly covered by IHL such
as the GRP’s use of paramilitary units like the Citizen’s Armed Force Geographical Units
(CAFGU), Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVO) and armed fanatical groups (AlsaMasa
and the like), in the AFP’s counter-insurgency programs and operations.
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The CARHRIHL clearly stipulates that the principles and standards of IHL shall be
applied to protect the rights of persons, entities or objects involved or affected in any
of the following cases or situations:
a. Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are
entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, human rights, political convictions and
their moral and physical integrity and shall be protected in all circumstances and
treated humanely.
b. The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the
armed conflict which has them in its custody or responsibility.
c. Neutral person or entities and medical personnel, including persons of humani-
tarian and/or medical organizations like the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), shall be protected and respected.
d. The civilian population and civilians shall be treated as such and shall be dis-
tinguished from combatants and, together with their property, shall not be the
object of attack.
e. Civilians shall have the right to demand appropriate disciplinary actions against
abuses arising from the failure of the Parties to the armed conflict to observe the
principles and standards of IHL.
f. The ICRC and other humanitarian and/or medical entities shall be granted facili-
tation and assistance to enable them to care for the sick and the wounded and to
undertake their humanitarian mission and activities (CARHRIHL Part IV: Respect
for International Humanitarian Law; Article 4, 1998).
From the careful scrutiny of the foregoing provisions of the CARHRIHL, the
researcher found that the Agreement can likewise serve as a legal and moral weapon
or instrument in the hands of the people to fight for, promote and broaden the exercise
of their human rights. It seeks to empower the people to confront, remedy and prevent
the most serious violations of human rights in terms of civil and political rights, to
uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms
with respect to the specific conditions of the country, and to demand justice and due
punishment of those responsible for violations of such.
2. The problems encountered in the implementation of the CARHRIHL, the causes of
violations, and the measures undertaken by the GRP and the NDFP to address the
violations
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2.1. The documented cases of violations in the CARHRIHL compiled by the JointMonitor-
ing Committee ( JMC) from June 2004 to December 2007 clearly reflected the problems
encountered in the implementation of the Agreement.
To provide for a more detailed and verified data regarding incidents of violations
in the CARHRIHL, the researcher sought the incident reports compiled by the Joint
Monitoring Committee from 2004 to 2007, the years when the JMC was created and
became operational.
According to the JMC Report, in the 43-month period from June 2004 to December
2007, it received 3,018 submissions of complaint forms. The GRP-nominated section
received 1,227 submissions against the forces of the GRP while the NDFP-nominated
section received 1,791 submissions against the forces of the NDFP.
The JMC Report revealed that the submissions against the GRP were filed at the
average rate of 28.53 per month. On the other hand, for 29 months, there were only
123 submissions against the NDFP.
The JMC Report also revealed that complaints filed against the forces of the GRP
during the period from June 2004 to December 2007 number 1,227. Most of these were
filed by human rights and people’s organizations and 168 by the victims and relatives
of victims.
However, careful scrutiny of the filed complaints showed that forty-five (45) of the
submissions or complaint forms were duplicates or refer to incidents which had been
the subject of previously filed complaints. Thus, the researcher realized that therewere
only 1,182 complaints against the GRP.
Further, the document revealed that of these 1,182 complaints, 246 (20.81%) involve
incidents of summary executions with 277 victims, 25 (2.12%) cases of massacres with
123 victims and 65 (5.50%) cases of enforced disappearances with 101 victims.
In terms of the nature of violations, the JMC Report highlighted that around 71.57%
or 846 complaints involve incidents of other violations of human rights including tor-
ture, illegal arrest, forced evacuation, violation of the rights of hors de combat, fake
surrender, etc.
Table 1 shows the number of complaints per region. The three regions with the
most number of complaints comprising more than 56% are Southern Tagalog, Central
Visayas and Central Luzon.
According to key informants from the human rights organizations interviewed by the
researcher, the Southern Tagalog, Central Visayas and Central Luzon regions registered
the highest number of complaints of human rights violations because these were the
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Table 1: Complaints Filed Against the GRP Per Region.
Region Incidents Percent
Southern Tagalog 319 26.94
Central Visayas 181 15.31
Central Luzon 169 14.3
Eastern Visayas 86 7.28
Bicol 75 6.35
National Capital Region (NCR) 74 6.26
Caraga Region 72 6.09
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) 45 3.81
Davao 36 3.05
Western Visayas 35 2.96
South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,




Northern Mindanao 18 1.52
Cagayan Valley 16 1.35
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
8 0.67
Western Mindanao 5 0.42
Zamboanga Peninsula 2 0.17
Overseas Filipino Workers 1 0.08
TOTAL 1,182 100.00
Source: Joint Monitoring Committee ( June 2004-December 2007)
areas prioritized by the implementation of the counter-insurgency Operational Plans
Bantay Laya I and II. The informants were of the singular view that the GRP’s armed
forces focused its massivemilitary operations in these areas primarily because the AFP
perceived that the armed component of the NDFP which is the NPA gathers its biggest
political, financial and logistical support from the rural and urban areas situated in the
provinces within these regions.
The data also revealed that the three years with the most number of complaints
comprising more than 61% are 2005, 2006 and 2004, respectively.
Table 2 shows the number of complaints filed against the GRP per year of incident.
The data, particularly for the years 2004-2006, suggest that the surge in the number of
human rights violations during these years can be attributed to the intrinsic component
of the counter-insurgency program of the GRPwhichwas driven by the tactical military
approach that eliminating the legal/political structure of the dissidents weakens and
consequently destroys the entire armedmovement. This analysis was corroborated by
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Source: Joint Monitoring Committee ( June 2004-December 2007)
various independent local and international human rights fact-finding investigations
and field reports conducted during that time, notably by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Prof. Philip Alston who
himself had concluded in his November 2007 report that this counterinsurgency strat-
egy, as an approach within the global context of the so-called war on terror, “focuses
on dismantling civil society organizations that were purported to be CPP front groups”
(Alston, 2007).
Table 3: Complaints Filed Against GRP Per Alleged Perpetrator.
Perpetrator Incidents
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 752
Philippine National Police (PNP) 267
Unidentified military units 113
Paramilitary (CAFGU, etc.) 103
Civilian National Unit (Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, Department of Interior and Local Government, etc.)
62
Private security agency 50
Local Government Unit (LGU) 42
Landlord/caretaker/management 41
Civilian agents 40
Goons, private army, etc. 27
Unclassifiable 21
American soldier 1
Source: Joint Monitoring Committee ( June 2004-December 2007)
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Table 3 shows the different types of perpetrators and the number of complaints in
which they were involved.
As to the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations, the study revealed that in
752 complaints, the AFP was the identified perpetrator, followed by the PNP (267) and
by unidentified military units (113).




Outside coverage 42 2.35
Falsely attributed 41 2.29
Reported
Legitimate military operation 138 7.70
Implementation of revolutionary justice and
legal system
32 1.79
Implementation of movement’s revolutionary
policies on taxation, environment and
promotion of rights of workers and
farmworkers
31 1.73
For further study 6 0.33
TOTAL 1,791 100.00
Source: Joint Monitoring Committee ( June 2004-December 2007)
Table 4 shows the different classifications of complaints filed against the NDFP.
Gathered data revealed that, as of December 31, 2007, the JMC received 1,791 sub-
missions or complaint forms against the forces of the NDFP, almost all submitted by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Of
these, 1,373 (76.67%) were submitted wholesale on November 8, 2006 by the Judge
Advocate General’s Service ( JAGS) office of the AFP.
Of the 1,791 complaint forms, 152 were either duplicates of previously submitted
complaints or weremultiple submissions for a single incident. Thus, therewere actually
only 1,639 submissions against the forces of the NDFP.
Two hundred one (201) submissions concerned incidents which were reported in
publications or public statements of the NDFP forces. After analyzing the submissions,
the researcher had further broken these down into the following:
1. 138 concerned incidents involving legitimate military operations (ambushes,
raids, firefights and encounters between the armed forces of the GRP and the
NDFP) or attacks on legitimate military targets by forces of the NDFP;
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2. 32 concerned incidents in connectionwith the implementation of the NDFP forces’
justice and legal system (which conforms and abides by internationally accepted
standards on due process, fair trial, judgement and punishment); and
3. 31 concerned incidents in connection with the implementation of the NDFP forces’
policies on taxation, on protection of the environment and on the promotion of
the rights of workers and farmworkers to unionize and for fair wages and better
working and living conditions.
According to the informant from the NDFP Panel, these 201 incidents did not con-
stitute violations of the CARHRIHL because most (138) involved actual armed hostili-
ties between the two parties in the civil war, while the rest (64) were in connection
with the exercise of political authority by the NDFP forces. However, the NDFP had
previously said that it may look further into the 64 incidents in accordance with the
guidelines of the NDFP Negotiating Panel and subject to the principles, policies, rules
and circumstances of the revolutionary movement.
2.2. The study identified the following causes of violations in the CARHRIHL:
(a) the opposing parties’ differences in the framework and interpretation of the oper-
ationalization of the CARHRIHL;
(b) the not fully functioning Joint Monitoring Committee ( JMC); and
(c) the militarist counter-insurgency paradigm and approaches by the GRP security
forces.
(a) The Philippine Government and the NDFP have diametrically opposed perspectives
regarding the framework and interpretation of the operationalization of the CARHRIHL.
For the GRP, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
explained:
“The CARHRIHL states that until the parties have reached a final resolution of
the armed conflict, the GRP and the NDFP will assume separate duties and
responsibilities for upholding, protecting and promoting human rights and
international humanitarian law (IHL) principles according to their own polit-
ical principles, organizations and circumstances. The full implementation of
the CARHRIHL is, therefore, dependent on the agreements on political and
constitutional reforms, and on end of hostilities and disposition of forces,
which have yet to be negotiated.
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“Since it cannot be fully implemented without these agreements,
CARHRIHL’s implementation has focused mainly on each side’s Monitoring
Committee receiving and investigating complaints of human rights and IHL
violations by both the NPA rebels and the government’s security forces.
The NDFP’s perspective of the operationalization of the CARHRIHL as explained by a
former political prisoner who was one of the key informants interviewed for the study:
“Since the CARHRIHL’s signing in 1998, Philippine administration after administration
had low regard for or had cursory approval of the Agreement, to say the least. The
document was finished in March 1998 but President Ramos did not sign it before his
term ended in June. It took another president, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to sign it. And
that was it for the CARHRIHL after the signing, an agreement in paper only.”
The NDFP Panelist informant lamented that, “With the long impasse from the Arroyo
government up to the Aquino administration, the mechanism that is JMC had been
reduced to a mere desk receiving complaints from victims of human rights violations.
What to do with the complaints and how to jointly tackle them, have had yet to be
realized. Worse, under the Aquino presidency, the GRP viewed the CARHRIHL as the
NDF’s ‘propaganda tool’. The GRP then had this derisive notion that the NDF was using
human rights violations and the CARHRIHL as a ploy to achieve a belligerent status
under international law.”
For the human rights sector, the CARHRIHLwas a big step forward towards a peaceful
country. Twenty five years after the first peace talks and seventeen years after the
document was signed, the CARHRIHL, for them, is still the only substantive agreement
to ever have come out of this peace negotiations. But violence is still happening on the
ground and civilians are still continually affected by the conflict. The CARHRIHL as an
agreement should help mitigate and prevent further devastation to civilians, yet more
and more lives are being injured and lost as this armed conflict continues to surge.
They said that CARHRIHL violations – allegedly perpetrated by government forces and
the NPA – continue to occur.
It can be surmised from the diametrically opposed standpoint and adversarial dec-
larations taken previously by the GRP and NDFP negotiating panels, that it would be
really impossible for the peace talks to have taken off, given the surrounding cir-
cumstances and atmosphere of distrust prevailing at the time. This only shows the
quintessential need for both the GRP and NDFP to honor, abide by and reaffirm their
commitment to the bilateral agreements previously signed by both parties, such as
the Hague Joint Declaration and the JASIG. These agreements had already laid down
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the fundamental framework, agenda, objectives and guiding principles for the entire
peace process to succeed.
(b) The not fully functioning Joint Monitoring Committee ( JMC)
Part V of the CARHRIHL stipulates that a Joint Monitoring Committee ( JMC) will be
formed to monitor compliance with the Agreement by both the GRP and the NDFP.
The JMC is composed of three representatives each from the GRP and the NDFP, with
both parties nominating two independent observers each to sit in all meetings but
without the right to vote. The JMC is supposed to meet every three months or as
often as necessary in the Philippines or elsewhere upon the agreement of the JMC
co-chairmen.
Unfortunately, since it was convened on February 14, 2004 in Oslo, Norway, the JMC
had not had the opportunity tomeet to perform its task. The reason is because the GRP
and the NDFP clearly did not see eye to eye on how the JMC should work especially
during times of impasse in the peace negotiations.
For the GRP, the JMC cannot meet while the formal talks in the peace negotia-
tions were suspended. Moreover, the GRP Panel insisted on its interpretation that the
joint operations of the JMC depend upon the status of the peace process between
the GRP and the NDFP. It cited Part VI, Article 3 of the CARHRIHL, which states that
“the CARHRIHL shall be subject to the Comprehensive Agreements on Political and
Constitutional Reforms and on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces.”
Fidel Agcaoili, chairperson of the NDFP Human Rights Committee and of the NDFP
Monitoring Committee, in his letter to the GRP Monitoring Committee in August 25,
2004, reiterated the NDFP position that “the JMC, as a joint mechanism of the Parties
created under the CARHRIHL to monitor its implementation, has a life of its own sepa-
rate from what is happening across the negotiating table. In fact, the JMC has its own
terms of existence and termination under the CARHRIHL.”
The NDFP maintained that “the work of the JMC as provided for in the CARHRIHL is
not dependent on the holding of the formal talks. The JMC takes its mandate from
the CARHRIHL which remains binding and in full force and effect on the two par-
ties whatever may be the situation in the formal talks. Thus, there is no reason why
the JMC cannot meet regularly or as often as agreed upon to discuss and plan joint
investigations on complaints of alleged human rights and international humanitarian
law violations even in the present situation where the formal talks have practically
remained indefinitely postponed” (Agcaoili, 2006).
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Comparing and analyzing the basic stand and interpretation of both sides regarding
the work and operationalization of the JMC, the researcher realized that there should
be a clear implementing guidelines drawn and agreed upon by the GRP and the NDFP
that shall stipulate in detail the joint responsibility, accountability and activities to be
undertaken by both parties, jointly or separately, in the course of implementing the
provisions of the CARHRIHL.
(c) The militarist counter-insurgency paradigm and approaches by the GRP security
forces
Based on the analysis of data presented by the JMC, specifically on the documented
incidents alleging the perpetrators of violations in the CARHRIHL during the period
2004-2007, it is highly suggestive that the implementation of the GRP’s counterinsur-
gency programs Oplan Bantay Laya I and II during the Arroyo administration had been
one of the main aggravating factors in the violations in the CARHRIHL.
This observation had been corroborated by separate and independent local and
international fact-finding missions conducted by the UN Human Rights Council,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, World Council of Churches, US Methodist
Church and Karapatan, to name a few.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Prof.
Philip Alston, concluded in his November 2007 report that this COIN strategy, as an
approach within the global context of the so-called war on terror, “focuses on disman-
tling civil society organizations that are purported to be ‘CPP front groups’.” Likewise,
Alston noted that “the campaign was a deliberate strategy in keeping with the overall
trajectory of COIN thinking at the national level” (Alston, 2007).
In its August 2006 report on the Philippines, Amnesty International stated: “The
common features in the methodology of the attacks, leftist profile of the victims, and
an apparent culture of impunity shielding the perpetrators, has led Amnesty Interna-
tional to believe that the killings are not an unconnected series of criminal murders,
armed robberies or other unlawful killings. Rather, they constitute a pattern of polit-
ically targeted extrajudicial executions taking place within the broader context of a
continuing counterinsurgency campaign” (Amnesty International Report, 2006).
As a COIN measure, OBL’s focus on the “political component” and “white area oper-
ations” was described by veteran reporter and columnist Amando Doronila in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer in June 21, 2006:
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“The blueprint of war outlined in ‘the orders of battle’ of OBL envisages
decimation of non-military segments of the communist movement. It is not
designed to engage the NPA in armed conflict in field warfare. It is desig-
nated to butcher andmassacre defenseless non-combatants. It is therefore a
sinister plan for civilian butchery, a strategy which exposes the military and
police to fewer risks and casualties than they would face in armed fighting
with the communist guerillas.
“The emphasis of this strategy on “neutralizing” front/legal organizations
helps explain why most of the victims of the past five years have been non-
combatants and defenseless members of the Left. During that period the
number of murdered aboveground members of the Left has far exceeded
fatalities of the NPA in armed encounters with security forces.”
From the analysis of data, the researcher revealed that most of the victims of viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian lawwere persons associatedwith
Leftist organizations, church people, community leaders, farmers, journalists, lawyers,
members of party list groups or parliamentary opposition, human rights activists, or
witnesses to extrajudicial killings. Most of the killings had taken place in those regions
of the country that were identified as ‘priority areas’ in the implementation of the
AFP’s counter-insurgency campaigns, as shown in Table 1 in the previous discussion.
2.3. Measures undertaken by the GRP and the NDFP to address the violations in the
CARHRIHL
Both the GRP and the NDFP had undertaken various steps for the spirit and intent
of the CARHRIHL — to make the armed conflict more humane and to protect civilians
— be realized.
The GRP panel declared that the GRP-Monitoring Committee (GRP-MC) had tried to
spread awareness and understanding of the CARHRIHL among stakeholders. The GRP-
MC offered orientation seminars, including workshops, on the HR/IHL-related laws to
various members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National
Police (PNP) across the country. It added that the PNP has participated in several GPH-
MC Basic Orientation Seminars (BOS) on the CARHRIHL, while the PNP has included
the CARHRIHL in human rights & IHL seminars for police personnel.
As part of the GRP’s effort in the implementation of the CARHRIHL, punitive laws
such as the Anti-Enforced Disappearance (RA 10353), Anti-Torture (RA 9745) and IHL
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Law (RA 9851) had been enacted to hold perpetrators accountable for any committed
human rights and international humanitarian law violations.
The GRP Peace Panel reported the creation of the Inter-Agency Committee under
Administrative Order No. 35 to fast track the resolution of cases of extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, torture and other grave human rights violations.
Information provided by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP) declared that the GRP had ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 1952
and Protocol II in 1986 during the Corazon Aquino presidency.
According to the key informant from the GRP Panel, the Philippine Government thru
its Peace Panel acknowledged having signed the CARHRIHL and assured the NDFP of
its commitment to comply with its obligations under the said Agreement.
For its part, the NDFP reported that “the CARHRIHL has become part of the legal
and judicial system of the revolutionary movement in accordance with the NDFP Dec-
laration of Approval of the CARHRIHL signed by the Chairperson on the NDFP National
Council on April 10, 1998. Moreover, the Agreement had been incorporated in the basic
study course of the NPA and is imbibed by the NDFP’s local organs of political power.”
The NDFP declared that even before the CARHRIHL its forces had already been
upholding, respecting and promoting human rights and international humanitarian law
in accordance with its basic principles as reflected in the following list of guidelines
and policies:
a. Guide for Establishing the People’s Democratic Government which contains provi-
sions on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens (Part III) and the People’s
Court (Chapter III of Part II);
b. The Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform;
c. The Basic Rules of the New People’s Army (NPA) which contain the Three Main
Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention for officials and members of
the NPA;
d. Memorandum on the Minimum Age Requirement for NPA Fighters from the Exec-
utive Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philip-
pines (CPP);
e. Rules in the Investigation and Prosecution of Suspected Enemy Spies released by
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPP;
f. Policies and processes on arrest, treatment, trial, punishment or release of pris-
oners of war (POWs); violators of human rights, etc.
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The NDFP also reported in its publications that it had launched educational cam-
paigns on the CARHRIHL among its forces. The CARHRIHL had become a basic study
material in the CPP, NPA and other mass organizations.
As part of its commitment to uphold international humanitarian law, the NDFP on July
5, 1996 unilaterally declared its undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and Protocol I of 1977. Previously, on August 15, 1991, the NDFP unilaterally declared
its adherence to Protocol II by means of the Declaration of Adherence to International
Humanitarian Law.
Aside from educational campaigns, the NDFP also reported that it had investigated
human rights violations and rendered justice to the victims.
According to the informant representing the NDFP Panel, “In battle, the NPA had
always treated its prisoners of war humanely and with utmost respect for their rights.
The NPA guerrillas had treated enemies wounded in the battlefield and had avoided
armed encounters in communities, desisted from setting up camps among civilian
houses, among others.”
The NDFP informant added that, “Onmany occasions, the NDFP had released prison-
ers of war on humanitarian grounds and acted to ensure their proper and safe release.
It had coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on this
matter. The NDFP had complied with international conventions on the minimum age
requirement for recruitment to the NPA, on the proper use of landmines, and on the
treatment of medical, religious and humanitarian organizations.”
3. Steps that can be done by the GRP, the NDFP and human rights organizations to
improve the mechanism for the implementation of the CARHRIHL
The key informant from the GRP intimated that the pillars of the State’s criminal
justice system that include the courts, law enforcement agencies, and corrections and
penal institutions should all be invited to work together in CARHRIHL education and
in strengthening its monitoring, and in improving the human rights situation in the
country. The government must strengthen coordination, collaboration and cooperation
among said government agencies towards this end.
The informant added that a law to protect human rights defenders must be enacted
while the full implementation of the existing human rights laws such as the Anti-
Torture Act must be realized. It should allocate more budget for the Government’s
Witness Protection Program in order to encouragemore victims to come out and report
CARHRIHL violations.
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The informant added that the government should develop a CARHRIHL Case
Database that is credible, updated, and acceptable to all parties which can be inde-
pendently developed and maintained.
Likewise, the government should foster wider public support and create more
opportunities for multi-sectoral initiatives about CARHRIHL to develop a peace con-
stituency. Human rights concepts and issues should be promoted through fora and
trainings. It should recommend the inclusion of the study of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law in the curriculum of schools while requiring teachers and
other government employees to undergo intensive human rights training.
According to the interviewed informant from the NDFP, appropriate disciplinary
measures should be meted out to the erring units and individuals, and reparations
should be made to the victims of such violations where the NDFP has verified com-
plaints of violations to have actually occurred.
The informant also reported that the NDFP forces, particularly the NPA, must strictly
abide by the war protocols such as the minimum age requirements in the recruitment
(18 years of age) of its combatants, the proper use of (command-detonated) landmines
as mandated by the Ottawa Treaty, and the proper treatment of medical, religious and
humanitarian organizations.
Representatives of human rights groups’ responses were to intensify people’s
awareness of the provisions of the CARHRIHL by means of launching massive grass-
roots education campaign among the members of the community and the govern-
ment, as well.
They also reported that crucial to the strengthening of the implementation of the
CARHRIHL is to increase the role of the community through sustained human rights
education in the communities.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on the foregoing findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn:
1. The CARHRIHL is of vital importance for the continuance and advancement of the
entire peace process. It is key to the forging of succeeding agreements based on
the sequence of tackling the remaining three substantive items in the agenda.
Its strict and sincere implementation builds stronger mutual trust for both sides of
the negotiating table, thereby creating a non-adversarial atmosphere and more
conducive environment for continuing the peace talks and for the further advance
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of the entire peace process until it finally opens the door for a possibility of
peaceful political settlement of the armed conflict in the country.
2. There are three main factors causing the violations or non- implementation of
the CARHRIHL – (1) the Parties’ differences in the framework and interpretation
of the operationalization of the CARHRIHL; (2) not fully functioning Joint Moni-
toring Committee; and (3) continuing militarist counter-insurgency paradigm and
approaches by the GRP security forces.
3. The strict and full compliance with the CARHRIHL can be realized only if both
parties exercise political will and are sincere in attaining the ultimate goal of
the peace negotiations – to bring just and lasting peace in Philippine society.
This can be achieved by honoring and adhering to previously signed agreements
such as the 1992 The Hague Joint Declaration, 1995 Joint Agreement on Safety
and Immunity Guarantees, among others, that laid down the framework and
fundamental principles in the conduct of the peace negotiations.
4. The active and informed participation of the citizenry in the peace process is of
crucial importance for the successful conduct of the peace talks and in ensuring
that both parties’ commitments are honored and complied with. People’s aware-
ness should be bolstered and they should be involved and informed every step
of the way, in whatever manner and capacity they can.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the following recommendations are offered:
1. The GRP and the NDFP should honor and abide by the previously signed agree-
ments such as the Hague Joint Agreement and the Joint Agreement on Safety
and Immunity Guarantees ( JASIG) that laid down the framework, objectives and
guiding principles for the conduct of the peace talks. This should provide a safe
and conducive environment for the negotiations and provide the correct and
mutually-accepted framework for compliance with past and future agreements.
Both parties must immediately implement the Supplemental Guidelines for the
JMC.
2. The GRP, the NDFP and other stakeholders should initiate in Congress the imme-
diate repeal of the Human Security Act of 2007 and other existing repressive laws
and issuances and reversal of jurisprudence engendering or providing sanction or
impunity for human rights violations.
3. Put an end to the criminalization of political offenses and actions in pursuit
of one’s political beliefs, illegal arrest and detention, and the practice of filing
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trumped-up criminal charges against activists and human rights defenders by
enacting the Human Rights Defenders Bill. This should also provide for the
immediate, speedy, meaningful and effective justice to all victims of human
rights violations including adequate compensation, indemnification, restitution
and rehabilitation and establishing mechanisms for this purpose.
4. The implementation of purely militarist counter-insurgency campaigns and pro-
grams that target civilians and human rights defenders should be discontinued
and carefully evaluated. The GRP should decisively push for the review and
update existing human rights training for police and security forces with the
assistance of independent non-governmental organizations to foster more con-
sistent application of international human rights standards, including the UN Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms.
5. The GRP and the NDFP must implement transparent and inclusive mechanisms
of public consultations with human rights organizations and peace advocates on
all issues mentioned above and enable their more effective involvement in the
preparation of law and policy by holding periodical comprehensive consultations
with them. Extensive and intensive information and education campaign down
to the grassroots level should be regularly conducted to achieve firm and deep
understanding of the full scope of human rights and international humanitarian
law.
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